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Summary
The recent financial performances of many Bulgarian SOEs have revealed the 
shortcomings in the management of its SOEs. The main direction of Bulgarian 
reforms should be improving transparency, better selection and appraisal of 
management, sustainable dividend policy, strengthening financial discipline and 
coherent ways to reduce the debt burden. The institutional status quo is clearly 
inefficient and needs to be replaced. 
The direction of SOE governance reforms in Korea and Bulgaria are substantially 
different. Korea has maintained a very centralized grip over SOEs for an extended 
period of time, and it needs to reduce government intervention by guaranteeing 
more autonomy for SOEs. On the other hand, Bulgaria needs more centralized 
control over SOEs, which is expected to improve their performance. The Korean 
experience in reforming its SOE management system is highly relevant for Bulgaria 
and it complies with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises. 
This paper asks 31 questions regarding a system of good governance and presents 
options for each question regarding positive and negative aspects, followed by 
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specific recommendations for the Bulgarian government. It is recommended that a 
centralized authority responsible for the management of SOEs be established which 
is composed of line vice-ministers and experts from academia and the private sector. 
Major tasks and responsibilities should be transferred gradually from line ministries 
to this new setting. Among these include increasing transparency, the introduction 
of an evaluation system with strict consequences and related open competitive 
procedures for the selection, the appointment and appraisal of CEOs, as well as an 
annual bonus system. 
SOE governance reform in Bulgaria will touch off strong resistance from both 
line ministries and their SOEs. Therefore, it will require a good deal of effort and 
strategy to accomplish the task. It is important to win the minds of the people and 
the political leadership in that the current system is subject to a number of problems, 
and that reform of the system is critical to a more efficient economy and provision of 
better public services to its citizens.
1. Introduction
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in any country are criticized as less efficient than 
the private sector. Since they are free from the risk of bankruptcy or even from 
competition in many cases, their slack management is not surprising. Members of 
an SOE labor union often enjoy higher job security, a relatively lighter workload 
and even higher compensation, including fringe benefits, than those in private 
companies, and this is why a labor union is militantly against any privatization plan. 
Politically motivated, the government often initiates projects using SOEs’ budgets. In 
Korea, many under-utilized kinds of infrastructure are examples of such politically-
driven projects. A low utility rate for services offered by SOEs dampens their financial 
imbalance even more. However, SOEs are not that keen about the need for reform. 
Rather, they have little motivation to change the status quo. So the question is: How 
can we make SOEs provide better services at a lower cost?
Although Korea’s SOEs are not free from the above-mentioned problems, most 
demonstrate world-class performance. Incheon International Airport, for instance, 
has been rated number one in the ASQ global ranking by ACI for a decade.1) KEPCO 
(Korea Electric Power Corporation) exhibits the lowest black-out rate in the world. 
KORAIL (Korea Railway Corporation) shows one of world’s highest on-time arrival 
rates.2) Even on the cost side, SOEs in Korea have maintained reasonably efficient 
1) ASQ (Airport Service Quality), ACI (Airport Council International).
2) As a part of the evaluation system for SOEs, the Korean government introduced a so-called global 
comparative index system in which an evaluation is made based on the relative performance of an 
SOE compared to the best performing SOEs in the world. This comparative evaluation system has been 
abolished now since almost all Korean SOEs ranked top in the world, thereby rendering the global 
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and sometimes innovative management, although this may not be comparable with 
private companies. 
What are the reasons behind the relatively good performance of SOEs in Korea? 
The most important explanatory variable is the Framework Act on SOE Management 
enacted in 1983, of which a revised version is now called the Act of the Management 
of Public Institutions. Among many features of the Act, there are two salient factors 
that have not changed since 1983: A central governance system and a strong 
evaluation system.
An SOE is one of the categories of the 323 public institutions in Korea.3) Among 
public institutions, SOEs have two distinct conditions: (1) It should be a corporation 
whose shares are owned by the government or by other public institutions controlled 
by the government. (2) Its revenue from the market should be more than 50 percent 
of its total revenue including the government budget. If a public institution does 
not meet any of these two conditions, it is categorized as a quasi-government 
organization (QGO). There are 30 SOEs in Korea as of 2016.4) 
On the other hand, SOEs in Bulgaria have enjoyed a very high level of autonomy 
not only in their internal management but also in their project selection and even in 
their pricing. Each line ministry as the owner of the SOEs under its umbrella appoints 
the CEOs, but there is no formal evaluation process. There has been discussion 
on more centralized SOE governance in Bulgaria, but it could not overcome the 
resistance of line ministries and their SOEs. 
This paper explains the SOE governance structure of Bulgaria, and tries to propose 
policy recommendations to improve the efficiency of SOEs in Bulgaria based on the 
Korean experience. Section 2 demonstrates the current standing of SOE governance 
in Bulgaria. Section 3 and 4 is the core part of the research which illustrates policy 
recommendations for the Bulgarian government regarding 31 key questions 
necessary for a good governance system for SOEs. For each of the 31 questions, 
different options are set side-by-side with their positive and negative aspects before 
a specific recommendation is proposed for Bulgaria. Section 3 focuses on governing 
bodies and policy tools for controlling SOEs, and Section 4 highlights an evaluation 
system, the most important policy tool for SOEs in Korea. Section 5 presents a 
index useless.
3) These public institutions are public organizations designated as such by the government. Since the 
definition is rather vague, the number of public institutions varies slightly year to year. The common 
characteristic of public institutions is the influence of the government in the appointment of the head 
of the organization.
4) These are again divided into two groups: market-based SOEs with more than 85% revenue from 
the market, and semi-market based SOEs with more than 50%, but less than 85%, revenue from the 
market. There is no difference in the government policy towards those two groups. A list is available in 
the appendix 2.
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summary and various conclusions.
2. Description of Bulgaria’s SOEs and  
its Governance
2.1. Overview 
As per the legal framework in Bulgaria there are two legal definitions. In this 
report, we will use the term SOEs referring to the first category of the following:
• Commercial companies with state participation: These are fully commercialized 
companies that apply Commercial Law rules and are referred to as companies 
with state participation. In addition to the general provisions of the Commercial 
Law the Regulation for Exercising the Ownership Rights in the Commercial 
Companies with State Participation stipulates the specific rules for governing 
those enterprises since they differ from the private companies. Enterprises with 
more than 50 percent of state participation are further governed by regulation 
No. 114 of the Council of Ministers for Monitoring of Financial Performance 
of SOEs (Attachment: List of enterprises with more than 50 percent state 
participation). 
• State enterprises: Enterprises that are state budget based; most are regulated 
by the provisions of a particular Law. This corresponds to quasi-government 
organizations (QGOs) in Korea. 
After a prolonged and hesitant privatization process, the public sector in 
Bulgaria was reduced to 157 companies where state participation is more than 50 
percent.5) SOEs contribute about 5 percent of GDP and employ about 7 percent of 
the labor force. They are concentrated in several sectors such as medical services, 
transportation, water supply and sewage, energy (electricity and gas), and 
production of arms, by the order of its employment size.
In terms of GDP share in each sector, the largest sector is transportation, followed 
by medical services, energy, mining, water supply, and agriculture. The total GDP 
contribution by SOEs reached its peak around 2011 and is now in a declining trend.
 
5) Without hospitals and enterprises with less than 50% state participation.
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[Figure 1-1] Size of Employment in SOEs in Bulgaria
Source: National Statistical Institute (NSI). The NSI does not compile and publish data on SOEs sector. For the 
purposes of this project the NSI compiled data for 2014 based on the annual balance sheets and financial 
reports of SOEs. 
(Unit: thousands EUR)
500,000
0
2,500,000
4,500,000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
[Figure 1-2] Total Value-added of all SOEs
Source: National Statistical Institute (NSI). The NSI does not compile and publish data on SOEs. For the purposes of 
this project, the NSI compiled data for 2014 based on the annual balance sheets and financial reports of 
SOEs. 
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2.1.1. General Problems for SOEs in Bulgaria 
Performance in general is weak and the diminishing role of SOEs in the overall 
GDP and employment is a result of poor performance and management. A fully 
decentralized management system led to a rather wide range of performance. 
While some enterprises function efficiently, providing both public good and profit, 
others accrue huge deficits and burden the economy since non-serviced debts to the 
private sector and the state budget pose severe financial risks. The main challenges 
as regards the functioning of SOEs are as follows:
• Fragmented and often altered legal frameworks for SOEs. Full discretion 
of line ministers that lead to decentralized regulations and practices which 
vary between different ministries. Recently, two reports from the Bulgarian 
National Audit revealed that the line ministries do not efficiently exercise their 
responsibilities in managing state participation in the companies. In many 
ministries there are no internal rules for control over their performance, for the 
monitoring of business programs, for the evaluation of management, and the 
like. A recent IMF Article IV report also emphasizes that the weaknesses in SOEs 
governance pose a risk for economic and financial stability. 
• SOEs are not sufficiently transparent 
• Since 2010, the financial performance of SOEs is subject to regular monitoring 
and analysis according to regulation 114/2010 of the Council of Ministers. The 
data on each enterprise is published quarterly but not an analysis of the state-
owned sector, nor is there a dynamic or comparative analysis. 
• The board of directors and CEOs are directly employed without a selective 
procedure and clear job requirements. Management is subject to frequent 
change, rarely motivated by political preferences rather than the company 
performance.
• The dividend policy is unpredictable since the Council of Ministers makes ad 
hoc decisions every year. This puts the enterprises in an uncertain position and 
limits motivation for better performance. In past years, between 60 percent 
and 80 percent of SOEs’ dividends went to state budget revenues, thus 
restricting opportunities for investment and innovation in the SOEs sector. In 
2015, the government decided to request 50 percent of dividends from profits 
to be allocated to the state budget. 
• Privatization halted in the last five years. Almost no privatization deals were 
concluded, though there were about 20 SOEs that are eligible for privatization.
• Severe decapitalization of enterprises with a minority stake of the state and 
difficulties in privatizing the minority shares. There is evidence that SOEs do 
not perform efficiently and that profitability is very low. According to 2014 
financial reports for 152 companies with state participation over 50 percent, 
the net loss was 739 m BGN (496 m BGN in 2013). The main source of this loss 
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is the National Energy Company. Being the only sector where state enterprises 
prevail, this sector is the main source of financial losses. Among 152 enterprises, 
60 sustained losses, and 5 had zero profit.
• Most of the SOEs are highly indebted. Three companies have debts over BGN 
1 billion BGN (National Electric Company: BGN 3.5 billion, National Railway 
Company: approx. BGN 2 billion and Bulgarian Energy Holding: BGN 1.2 
billion). Almost all energy sector companies are highly indebted.
• The SOEs spend fewer funds for R&D than the private sector. The SOEs share of 
total R&D dropped from 69 percent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2011. 
2.1.2. Privatization Efforts
Privatization in Bulgaria was a huge and complex task. Prior to this and in the 
early years of transition, Bulgaria had an extensive industrial sector that represented 
approximately 60 percent of GDP. In addition, the private sector was practically 
nonexistent. The share of state property in the industry was about 95 percent. 
Companies were very large. Some 20 percent of companies had more than 5,000 
workers and two-thirds had more than 1,000 employees. Only five percent of 
companies had less than 200 workers. The productivity structure corresponded to 
the Soviet industrialization model and the international division of the labor in the 
framework of the CMEA exchange system. 
Privatization has been a slow process that has only accelerated since 1997. 
There have been several methods of privatization. The main methods were cash 
privatization, including MEBO sales, and mass privatization. Since 1997 with the 
consolidation of macroeconomic stability and external support, sales to foreign 
investors increased. 
Privatization in the country is almost complete. The pace of privatization over 
the last few years has been slow. In the first half of 2014, only three deals were 
signed amounting to BGN 1.3 million. The total number of SOEs for privatization 
comes to about 20 rather small companies. The sales of minority state shares and 
the privatization of infrastructure branches (energy, electricity production, water 
supply, etc.) have yet to be finalized. The privatization of the postal service and other 
public services is expected in the long run. Therefore, what is a priority for Bulgaria 
is to improve the governance system for SOEs, which is the research question of this 
paper.
The Privatization Agency has almost exhausted its mandate and needs 
institutional changes. Among possible options, one is to merge with a new SOEs 
management authority. A similar pattern of institutional change was applied recently 
by most Central and Eastern European countries. 
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2.2. Governance System for SOEs 
2.2.1. Governing Ministries
Practically all ministries govern SOEs in their respective sectors of competence as 
Appendix 1 shows. Although the Bulgarian model of SOEs management is rather 
decentralized, there are certain provisions that are obligatory for all enterprises with 
state participation. For example, all SOEs’ long-term assets can be sold only through 
a tender based on the price determined by licensed independent appraiser and 
after the approval of the line minister. Loans, borrowing or lending by SOEs can be 
done only after approval of the line minister. Similar are the restrictions set up in 
the Privatization Law. A common mechanism is established, which determines the 
remuneration of managers, members of the board, and of CEOs. The remunerations 
in general should be related to results, but in practice this differs depending on the 
different ministries and enterprises.
An assessment of the SOEs is conducted only once a year, together with the 
approval of the annual financial reports and it is rather formal. There is no regular 
monitoring and control over the implementation of business plans.
 
The institutional framework for SOEs in Bulgaria changed several times, starting 
from a stronger Council of Ministers control on the key SOEs to a fully decentralized 
structure where the ministers exercise full state ownership rights. One of the main 
changes in the last few years was the establishment of holding companies in the 
sectors controlled by the state, like energy and road infrastructure. Most of the 
ministries have in their structure special divisions that deal with SOEs. Their primary 
objective is to support the minister in his capacity of representing the owner (the 
state) in the SOEs. These include:
• supporting the management of SOEs in performing their functions; 
• preparing all the documents and positions of the state in the general meetings 
of the companies;
• preparing the legal acts for restructuring and closure of SOEs as well as the 
participation of SOEs in other companies; 
• giving instructions as regards the management of long-term assets;
• preparing the management contracts and monitors their implementation; 
• analyses the economic and financial performance of SOEs and preparing 
reports for the minster; 
• monitoring the financial indicators as per the regulation of the Council of 
Ministers; 
• monitoring the business plans of SOEs, 
• in the case of bankruptcy of the SOE the department recruits and dismisses the 
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liquidator; 
• supporting the established Audit Committees according to the Law for 
Independent Financial Audit; 
• supporting the SOEs in their participation in the relations in tripartite 
committees (with trade unions), 
• maintaining special register of SOEs; maintains a register of assets of SOEs; 
• preparing the needed documentation in the case of privatization.
Since the management system is rather decentralized, the practice varies between 
the ministries and also depends on the scope of state ownership in the respective 
sector. 
2.2.2. CEO and Board Member Appointment 
The Bulgarian Council of Ministers (CM) or the minister of the specific industry 
branch (Branch Minister, BM) exercise ownership rights in the companies with state 
participation in the capital (CSPC). In these companies, where state participation 
composes just a fraction of the capital, the BM or its representative participates 
in the General Meeting of company, complying with the requirements of the 
Commercial Law. In the companies where all of the capital is provided by the state, 
the CM/BM act as a sole proprietor and appoints the Company Manager (in the case 
of Ltd. companies) or, the Board of Directors (BD), respectively the Supervisory and 
Managing Board (SB and MB) in the case of join-stock companies. 
According to the powers entrusted, the sole proprietor:
• Selects and dismisses the Manager and Controller or members of the BD (SB 
and MB respectively);
• Determines the remuneration of the persons above.
The managers and the Board members in the Ltd companies and both physical 
and legal entities where permitted by the statutes of the shareholder companies. 
The number of members in the BD (SB and MB) is limited to five, except for the cases 
approved by the Council of Ministers. The number proposed by the sole proprietor 
must be in accordance to the share of the capital hold by the state. 
The managers and board members are not allowed to serve on more than one 
managing or controlling board of the CSPC. Those individuals are subject of various 
restrictions in terms of their loyal and prudent behavior to the specific company if 
they are:
• carrying out of commercial deals*;
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• being partners in limited or shareholding companies*;
• being CEO’s or BM in other companies*;
• taking the managing and controlling positions if sentenced by the court;
• being ministers; MPs, mayors and such officials;
• civil servants;
• being on a work contract.
* The first three are applicable if the field of operation of the CSPC coincides 
with the activities of the person in question.
The managing bodies of the CSPC report on a quarterly basis to the relevant sole 
proprietor, about their service: corporate performance, fulfillment of the business 
plan, possible problems and correction measures. The sole proprietor agrees on the 
contracts with the persons in question; in some cases, it might be completed through 
a competition. The contracts are for a maximum of 3 years. 
The contracts include the amount and forms of remuneration and a pledge 
regarding the performance of their duties. They also include a business plan on 
the whole mandate of the governing bodies, complying with the strategy of the 
company. It must be specific and hold economic targets, such as profits, market share, 
and employees.
Remuneration of CSPC managers and board members is supposed to be 
determined in accordance with the size of the long-term assets, the number of 
personnel, profitability, financial performance, the value added of an employee, 
servicing of company debt and more specific obligations, taken in the contracts. The 
final value is based on quantified indices and the minimum national salary for the 
specific month and limited to a five-month cap. It is expanded for executive members 
and managers representing the companies with a limiting cap up to 12 min salaries. 
Remuneration is determined and revised each quarter based on the achieved 
targets. Additionally, in case of a profit growth, a bonus is provided from the 
earnings after tax and dividends, though it is limited to one average monthly 
payment to the board members.
2.2.3. Dividend Policy
There are two key issues as regards the dividend policies: how much of the 
dividend remains in the company (what is the share provided to the state budget) 
as well as when the dividend is to be paid. Dividend policies in both aspects were 
rather unstable in the past few years. These policies are not stipulated in the Law but 
are subject to Government decisions. Certainly, this provides the Government with 
flexibility and the revenues from the dividend of SOEs could well serve as a buffer in 
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difficult budgetary times, but the uncertainty poses severe risks for the management 
of SOEs. A number of years ago the dividend policy was fixed in the State Budget 
Law, but this practice was recently abolished.
The other problem is that the state drains the dividends from enterprises. In the 
last few years the budget collected from 60 percent to 80 percent (after taxation) of 
dividends, which is an extremely unfavorable policy as compared to OECD countries. 
Furthermore, a more stringent policy is applied to some SOEs which perform well: for 
example, for Sofia Airport Ltd, the share from the profits provided to the budget is 
90 percent. In the past, the state as the owner of the SOEs established overly flexible 
dividend policies, listing ten SOEs for which additional sums (beyond 80 percent) 
had to be provided to the state budget (Regulation No. 285/2013 of the Council of 
Ministers). 
2.2.4. Managerial Autonomy
State-owned enterprises in Bulgaria are separate legal entities. They are registered 
in the Court as commercial companies and have their own capital provided by the 
state. They possess high managerial autonomy. The managers appointed by the line 
ministries have the right to make decisions that affect the strategic and operational 
problems of companies including to hire and fire staff, sign contracts with their 
commercial partners and to manage their finances. Managerial autonomy is limited 
in making these decisions is sought sanction from the state body that performs the 
functions of the owner of state capital:
• profit sharing and its payment and payment of bonuses to managers and their 
size;
• solutions to reduce and increase capital;
• determine the remuneration of managers;
• elect an auditor of the company;
• decisions to open or close branches and participating in other commercial or 
civil companies;
• on the acquisition and disposition of real estate and property rights;
• decisions to acquire or dispose of shares or shares-owned by the company in 
other companies, as well as acquisition or disposal of financial fixed assets of 
the company abroad;
• decisions for filing claims against the company manager or supervisor and 
appointing a representative to conduct trials against them;
• solutions for additional cash contributions;
• permission for lending to third parties and to grant security in favor of 
third parties; the conclusion of a judicial or extrajudicial agreement, which 
recognized obligations or forgive debt;
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• where authorization to dispose of fixed assets, lease real estate with a carrying 
amount that exceeds 5 percent of the total book value of fixed assets as 
on December 31 of the previous year; conclusion of credit agreements for 
cooperation in meeting promissory liabilities;
• selects the insurer before the conclusion of contracts compulsory insurance of 
property;
• permission for a mortgage and pledge of fixed assets of the company;
• appoint the liquidators at the company.
2.2.5. Internal and External Audit
An internal audit in state-owned enterprises is carried out according to the Law on 
Internal Audit in the public sector (Prom. SG. No. 27 of March 31, 2006). Under the law, 
all state-owned companies should employ internal auditors who have special training 
and qualifications. An internal audit helps the company to achieve its goals by:
1. Identifying and assessing risks in the company;
2. Assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of financial management and control 
with regard to:
a) Identification, assessment and risk management of the company 
management;
b) Compliance with laws, regulations and contracts;
c) Reliability and integrity of financial and operational information;
d) The effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations;
e) The protection of assets and information;
f) The implementation of tasks and achievement of objectives;
3. Recommendations for improving the activities of the company.
Large state enterprises and designated as ‘enterprises operating in the public 
interest’ from the following sectors: energy, trade and transit of natural gas, water, 
sewage and telecommunications services, and the “Bulgarian State Railways” EAD 
and its subsidiaries must have an audit committee. The Audit Committee performs 
the following functions:
1. Monitoring the financial reporting processes;
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of internal control;
3. Monitoring the effectiveness of risk management;
4. Monitoring the independent financial audit.
An external audit of state enterprises is done by selected by the AGM auditors 
and by the Bulgarian National Audit Office (BNAO). The BNAO audits are performed 
according to the annual program.
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3. Policy Options to Improve Institutional 
Framework for SOE Governance 
3.1. Governance Structure
3.1.1. Centralized vs. Decentralized Governing System
SOEs in Korea are under the control of two different government bodies. 
A relevant line ministry takes care of the business side of its SOEs, whereas the 
Management Committee chaired by Minister of MOSF (Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance) is in charge of the management side of all SOEs. Since the Committee and 
MOSF controls most of the managerial leverage such as evaluation, control over 
the number of staff, budget and remuneration, we can say that SOEs in Korea are 
centrally governed. 
There are many benefits to the central governance system. It can minimize 
the collusive behavior between an SOE and the relevant ministry which has been 
a source of inefficiency of SOEs. In conducting its policies, a line ministry often 
utilizes SOEs flexible budgets, and it can even enjoy post-retirement positions at 
the SOEs. In order to maintain such benefits, the line ministry is in general averse to 
the privatization of SOEs. The ministry may also have a tendency to tolerate overly 
generous compensation and surplus employment in SOEs. The OECD, therefore, 
recommends the central governance system to member countries. However, the 
central governance system may turn out to be rather inflexible since universal rules 
and regulation should be applied to all SOEs under different ministries. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option. Bulgaria does not have 
a centralized agency to manage SOEs, and instead each line ministry plays an 
ownership role. The current institutional framework gives unlimited powers to 
the line ministries in managing SOEs. That is why the practices applied by different 
ministries are rather different and control over their performance is weak. There was 
an attempt in 2010 with Regulation 114/2010 to give more power to the Ministry 
Positive Negative
Central system
- Tighter and more efficient 
management
- Better for privatization
- Inflexible management
- Conflicts with the line ministries
Decentralized to line 
ministries
- Flexible management for each 
SOE
- Collusion between line ministry 
and SOE
<Table 1-1> Governing System for SOE
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of Finance in monitoring the performance of SOEs with a focus on their financial 
situation. This did not lead to centralization or a strengthening of control, but 
instead the line ministries simply started to publish their SOEs’ quarterly financial 
reports on the Ministry of Finance web page. This attempt proves resistance to 
reforms in the status quo. The worsening financial situation of most SOEs, though, 
calls for a stronger and speedier reform process. This paper suggests a centralized 
system for Bulgaria in institutional reform. The main benefits of this option would 
be the introduction of uniform management practices, avoidance or a decrease 
of political influence over the nomination and replacement of CEO and boards of 
directors, as well as the introduction of an evaluation system.
3.1.2. The Central Body: Should It be a Committee or a Single 
Ministry?
The central governance system will touch off some resistance from line ministries 
which will have to lose some of their control over SOEs. It is therefore useful 
to establish a Management Board, which in Korea is named the Management 
Committee for SOEs. Being composed of vice-ministers of major line-ministries with 
SOEs, the Committee in Korea is an arena where major policy decisions on SOEs are 
coordinated and finalized. However, the Committee in general can slow down the 
decision-making process, and can make accountability a little unclear. In Korea, the 
speed of decision-making is an issue especially in the process of CEO appointments 
because the Committee cannot convene as frequently as it should be. Accountability 
is not an issue in Korea because it is clear that the decisions by the Committee are 
mostly driven by the Secretariat, which is a Bureau of Public Institution under MOSF. 
Positive Negative
No such Committee
(Instead, one central 
agency)
- Faster decision-making
- Better incorporation of the 
specific sectors’ concerns
- Freedom and flexibility at the 
company’s decision making 
level
- Difference in practices between 
the line ministries
- Limited control
Establish a Committee
- Participatory decision-making
- Useful inputs from themembers
- Harmonized rules for the 
management
- Sustainability of management 
and investment policy
- Transferability of best practices
- Economy of scale: it is expected 
that the staff of departments 
dealing with SOEs in each 
ministry should be limited since 
some of the functions will be 
transferred to the steering 
Committee
- Shared accountability
<Table 1-2> Management Committee for SOE
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is the second option. In order to ease expected 
resistance from line ministries, it will be useful to have a Committee with a presence 
of line ministries. A tentative name for the Committee could be the ‘Steering 
Committee for SOEs Management’. Each line ministry will maintain its control over 
the business side of SOEs as is the case in Korea. The most important question is 
which functions will be transferred to this Committee. The Committee should discuss 
topics, which are mainly related to the unified governance of the SOEs. The line 
ministers should keep their role with respect to the strategic governance of the 
companies in their sector. More specifically, the line ministers should be responsible 
for the topics and the issues, which are relevant to the general policy of the sector 
that they govern, in case that general policy is fulfilled by SOEs. 
3.1.3. Who Should Play the Role of Secretariat of the Management 
Committee?
The central governing Committee needs a Secretariat whose role is to assist the 
decision of the Committee. There are four candidates for the Secretariat. The first 
option is a ministry in charge of the national budget. The second option is a ministry 
in charge of planning or economic policy. The first and the second option results in 
the same ministry in Korea since both functions are in one ministry, MOSF.6) The third 
option is the Prime Minister’s Office. Finally, we may create a new government body 
independent from ministries specializing in the management of SOEs. In option one– 
through three, the Secretariat of the Management Committee should be placed 
under the corresponding agency, whereas that of option four will be newly created 
and placed directly under the Committee. Each option has strengths and weaknesses 
as explained in the following table.
Korea followed the first option for an extended period of time. Though the 
ministry name has changed on a number of occasions,7) the ministry with a budgetary 
function has always been the central agency in charge of SOE governance. The 
reasons are as follows. First, many SOE policies are boiled down to fiscal implications. 
Second, the budget office has accumulated knowledge on the line ministries and 
their SOEs. Third, it does not carry its own SOEs, which makes the budget office 
neutral. One problem for the budget office being the central agency is that, with a 
view to minimizing budgetary support for SOEs, it may allow SOEs to earn revenue 
from the market that should be enjoyed by the private companies rather than the 
government. However, this is not a problem in Bulgaria because SOEs in Bulgaria are 
prohibited from state aid.
6) In 2008, two ministries in charge of planning and budget (Ministry of Planning and Budget) and 
economic policy (Ministry of Finance and Economy) were merged in Korea.
7) Economic Planning Board (1961~1994), Board of Finance and Economy (1994~1998), Planning and 
Budget Commission (1998~1999), Ministry of Planning and Budget (1998~2008).
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is option four. An independent Secretariat is 
the best option because it can create a neutral, specialized body. The Ministry of 
Economy is one good option but neutrality is an issue because there are many SOEs 
currently under its auspices. The MOF is another good option but its central role will 
touch off a strong resistance from line ministries since the MOF is already a strong 
ministry. A conflict over the selection between the MOE and MOF for the central 
agency’s role could ruin the whole reform process. Although the creation of a new 
administrative body may be difficult, it will be easier than a choice between the 
MOE and MOF. The chairperson of the Management Committee will have to be at a 
minister level.
Positive Negative
Ministry with 
Budget Office
- Power for implementation
- Some experience inmonitoring 
the SOEs financial performance
- Stringent budgetary control
- Implementing the state aid rules 
as per the EUrestrictions
- The mandate of MOF is focused 
on the state budget and dealing 
with SOEs may defocus from the 
main priority fiscal policy and 
financial stability
- No expertise in different sectors 
of the SOEs, limited experience in 
SOEs management
- More resistance from line 
ministries since MOF is already a 
strong ministry
Ministry in charge 
of Economic Policy
- Policy of SOEs is one of economic 
policies
- Extensive experience in managing 
SOEs in a broad sector range
- In the EU SOEs management falls 
within the competence of DG 
Industry
- Its mandate on economic 
growth may encourage SOEs’ 
expansionary position.
- Does not have expertise 
in some sectors where the 
state participation is crucial 
(infrastructure, health, etc.)
- Limited power of the Minister of 
Economy, no fiscal and financial 
tools
Prime Minister’s 
Office (PMO)
- Neutrality
- SOE management may not be so 
important for PMO
- Insufficient staff, expertise and 
experience in SOEs management
Separate 
Secretariat 
Committee
- Specialization andNeutrality
- Can be compromise among 
ministries
- It may not have enough of 
leverages for SOEs.
- The new creation of government 
agency will take time
<Table 1-3> Candidates for Central Agency
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3.1.4. Composition of Management Committee 
The Management committee for SOEs in Korea is chaired by the minister of MOSF 
and is composed of vice ministers and experts who are mostly professors, lawyers or 
public accountants. There are three options for its composition: civil servants only 
and civil servants plus experts, and finally the inclusion of the labor union. There are 
many decisions made by the Committee that have a direct and significant impact 
on employers in SOEs. Therefore, the involvement of labor union members in the 
Committee makes sense, but it may seriously slow down the decision-making process. 
Korea allows the third option by law, but in effect follows option two. Labor unions 
in Korea are rather militant, so their members have not been seriously invited to the 
Committee yet. By and large, the Korean system has proven successful in enforcing 
more transparency and openness in the process.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option two. Bulgaria has extensive 
experience in inviting external experts in governing bodies and decision making as 
regards state affairs. Recently, external experts were broadly invited in the public 
procurement procedures but the results were not encouraging since the invited 
external experts tend to also be dependent. In spite of this, option two seems to 
be appropriate for Bulgaria as well for the following reasons: i) The outside experts 
will closely observe current SOEs performance and will serve as a public watchdog; 
ii) They will act like independent directors in the listed companies; iii) They will 
help increase transparency of SOEs. These experts should be nominated by a 
special selection procedure which needs to be elaborated. It would set professional 
requirements for experts, determine who has the right to nominate them, and who 
and how the experts should be selected. The current legal framework, particularly 
Article 19 of the Regulation for Exercising the Ownership Rights in the Commercial 
Companies with State Participation sets up the requirements for the CEOs and the 
members of the decision making bodies of SOEs, for example, boards of directors 
and supervisory boards. The regulation says who cannot be, instead of who could 
Positive Negative
Civil servants only
- Faster and more realistic decision 
making process
- Opacity
Civil servants + 
experts
- More neutral and diverse view 
provided by the experts
- Experts have a limitation in 
checking the central agency 
only to slow down the process
Civil servants + 
experts + labor union
- Openness
- Participation of major stakeholder
- More difficult decision making
- Information leakage
<Table 1-4> Composition of the Management Committee for SOEs
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be, members. There are restrictions for Members of the Parliament, persons who 
perform similar business activities, etc. Similar rules can be applied to the non-
government members of the Steering Committee. It is not recommendable, however, 
for the central agency or Steering Committee to include members from labor unions. 
The labor unions in Bulgaria participate in the tripartite cooperation counsel, along 
with the government and the employers’ organizations. There have been many cases 
in which decision making was delayed due to the questions and concerns raised by 
the labor unions. Should the labor unions participate in the Steering Committee, 
quick decision making will not be possible.
3.1.5. Who Should be Centrally Governed?
There are other types of public institutions in both Korea and Bulgaria. Those 
whose revenues mostly come from the government are called quasi-government 
organizations (QGO), and they are also governed by the Management Committee 
in Korea. However, the central agency can only supervise SOEs leaving QGOs in the 
hands of line ministries as in the second option.
The central agency in Korea only covered SOEs until 1998 when the Planning and 
Budget Commission later renamed as Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB), first 
tackled the inefficient operation of QGOs. Although the intervention of the MPB 
was lacking in legal background, line ministries had to stay silent because it was 
right after the financial crisis of Korea in 1997. The MPB realized the need for a legal 
foundation that enabled it to cover not only SOEs but also QGOs because those two 
types of public institutions have a lot in common. Since 2007, both SOEs and QGOs 
have been governed by the Act on the Management of Public Institutions. 
An SOE and QGO have both many similarities and dissimilarities. They provide 
a service to citizens on behalf of the government, and their CEOs are appointed by 
the government. Both SOEs and QGOs can collude with their relevant line ministries. 
However, QGOs’ revenue mostly comes from the government and not from the 
market, which makes them much more dependent upon the line ministries than 
Positive Negative
Both SOEs and QGO
- Equal treatment for both SOEs 
and QGOs who have many 
similarities
- Identical treatment for both 
SOEs and QGOs despite their 
difference
Only SOEs
- Less conflict with line ministries
- Different treatment for QGOs
- Loose management for QGOs
<Table 1-5> Coverage of Central Governance
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SOEs are. In other words, SOEs need to have more managerial flexibility than QGOs 
do, and this is why there is an argument in Korea that MOSF should return its grip 
over QGOs to line ministries. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option two, unlike Korea. Bulgaria’s central 
agency will have to cover only SOEs, leaving QGOs in the hands of the line ministries. 
QGOs in Bulgaria are called state enterprises. Including QGOs in the hands of the 
central agency may drive the whole reform process into a cul-de-sac. In Bulgaria 
most QGOs are created by specific laws where their functions and the ways they 
operate are fixed. This supports the choice of the second option proposed above of 
not changing the existing system with the exception maybe for closer monitoring of 
their functions. Depending on the relative performance of QGOs compared to SOEs, 
the central agency can raise this jurisdiction issue later. It is suggested that Bulgaria’s 
central body also cover privatization and post-privatization functions and governance 
of enterprises with a minority stake of the state. However, it is recommendable 
for Bulgaria’s central agency to apply the function review to QGOs which will be 
explained later in this paper. 
3.1.6. Open Recruitment vs. Direct Appointment for CEO
Although open public recruiting is a standard process for any appointment 
position, there are some problems as listed in the following. Sometimes, the 
most eligible person may not apply for the position for fear of losing in the open 
competition. Occasionally the one with the appointive power, such as the Office of 
the President, unofficially pre-designates the winner of the recruiting procedure, 
making the whole process useless. The open recruiting process also prolongs the 
appointment process.8) There is an argument in Korea that the current system 
has lower accountability than the direct appointment by the President since an 
intervention by the President or the Office of the President is camouflaged by a 
seemingly open and fair process. More important positions, such as cabinet ministers, 
are directly appointed by the President of Korea. The people accept the President’s 
selection since the ministers’ qualifications are examined in a Congressional 
Personnel Hearing. In this respect, direct appointment, coupled with an open public 
hearing, emerges as an effective way to recruit the most qualified person for the 
position. A public hearing for CEOs can be conducted by the central agency. There is 
a third option in which the one with appointive power chooses between option one 
and two for each case. 
8) Sometimes a CEO position is vacant for more than 6 months to complete the process.
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option. The current legislative 
framework does not require a public recruitment process for CEOs and boards 
members although the rule says that an open procedure may be applied.9) However, 
no minister prescribes such rules and opportunities, and therefore the practice is 
always a direct appointment by the responsible minister. There are no selection 
procedures, job requirements, public announcements, etc. Very often the appointees 
are simply political nominees without proper credentials and experience. Improving 
the procedure for the appointment of the CEO of a SOE is of crucial importance 
for its better governance. A more transparent and competitive procedure might 
be achieved if the full discretion of the minister is limited and an open selection 
procedure based on concrete qualification criteria is conducted. The open procedure 
certainly requires more time and qualified candidates may choose not to apply, but 
the benefits of the open procedure are enormous and will contribute to the better 
performance of SOEs. However, introducing a competitive recruitment process will 
be a radical reform that will limit political interference and that is why it will face 
resistance from political parties.
3.1.7. Who Should be Involved in the CEO Appointment Process?
The CEO appointment process in Korea is rather complex. The first step is the 
CEO Recommendation Committee in each SOE which is composed of non-standing 
board members and invited outsiders on an ad hoc basis, without any SOE insiders. 
In principle, the Board of Directors should play the role of the recommendation 
committee, but the Korean government wanted to separate the process from 
insiders. This committee accepts open applications, and selects –three to five 
adequate candidates. The second step is the Management Committee for SOEs 
chaired by the minister of MOSF, which narrows down options to –two to three 
9) “The management of the SOEs could be assigned after a competitive procedure set up by the 
minister.” (Regulation for Exercising the Ownership Rights in the Commercial Companies with State 
Participation).
Positive Negative
Openpublic recruiting
- Minimize collusive behavior
- Maximize transparency
- Time consuming
- The most eligible may not apply.
- Pre-designation by the 
appointer can make the process 
useless.
Direct appointment 
with public hearing
- Clear accountability of the 
appointer
- May open a door for corruption 
due to limited competition
Mix - Effectiveness of the system
<Table 1-6> Methods of Recruitment
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candidates. This decision by the Committee is supposed to be seconded by the 
relevant line minister, which is only a rubber stamp process. The third step is the 
appointment by the President of Republic of Korea.10) 
There are four different types of CEO appointment process. One extreme is 
Korean model that follows for all three steps. The other extreme is a direct appoint 
without the first step of open recruiting by Recommendation Committee (RC) and 
without the second step of review by the Management Committee (MC). There are 
two variations in-between the two extremes. Korea follows the first option of open 
public recruiting.
10) The CEO Appointment process for QGOs is relatively simpler than that for SOEs in that it does not go 
through the second step. The CEO of QGO is appointed by the relevant line minister rather than the 
President unless there is a separate specification. 
Sequence 1st step 2nd step 3rd step
Who
CEO 
Recommendation 
Committee (RC)
⇒ Management 
Committee (MC)
⇒
Appointment by 
the President
Where In each SOEs Under MOSF
Role
Public open 
application
Select 3–5 
candidates
⇒
Review of 
candidates
Narrow down to 
2–3
⇒
[Figure 1-3] Process of CEO Appointment for SOEs in Korea
Positive Negative
Both RC and MC
- Transparency
- Finding the most suitable 
person
- Time consuming
- The process may not be respected
Only MC - Minimize collusive behavior
- Too much power of the central 
agency
Only RC
- Accountability of each SOE’s 
Board of Directors
- Possibility of collusive behavior if 
the Board is not fully accountable
Neither RC nor MC 
(direct appointment)
- Time saving
- Accountability of the appointer
- Too much discretion of the 
appointer
<Table 1-7> Those Involved in the CEO’s Appointment
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is the third option (only RC, skipping the 
second step) in which each Board of Directors (or Recommendation Committee) in 
SOE narrows down the applicants to –two to three candidates so that the appointer 
appoints the best performing candidate. The second step of the Management 
Committee will not only slow down the appointment process but also will create a 
huge resistance from the line ministries who have to share their appointive power 
with the central agency. 
3.1.8. Who Appoints the CEO and Board Members?
The CEO of the SOE is appointed by the President in Korea, whereas in Bulgaria it 
is by the line ministers. There are four possible appointers of CEOs of SOEs: political 
leaders such as the President or Prime Minister, the Chair of Steering Committee (or 
central governing agency), relevant line ministers, or Chairman of Board of Directors.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option one or option three. It is a highly 
political decision to select option one. Bulgaria may find it very difficult to deviate 
from the current third option when the central agency takes a controlling power 
away from the line ministries. However, the source of inefficiency in SOEs is the 
collusive behavior between the line ministries and SOEs which will be reduced if the 
appointive power is given to political leaders such as the President or Prime Minister. 
If CEOs are appointed by a political leader, the relationship between the line ministry 
and the SOEs will become a little more horizontal and less collusive. Support for 
option three will depend on the fairness and openness of the recruiting process.
3.1.9. Composition of Board Members
The general rule is that the board needs to operate as a representative of the 
Positive Negative
Political leader 
(President, or PM)
Strengthen the independence 
of SOE
Less delegation from the top
Chair of Management 
Committee
Strengthen the power of  
the central agency
Resistance from line ministries
Relevant Line Minister
Accountability of  
the line ministry
Possibility of collusion
Chairman of Board of 
Directors
Accountability of  
the BoardIndependence of SOE 
from line ministries
Weak accountability of Board 
members
<Table 1-8> Who Appoints the CEO?
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whole entity. Regarding the composition of the board, there are three models: all 
insiders without non-standing members, all outsiders, or a mixed composition. Korea 
follows a mixed composition: more than half of the board members are composed 
of outside non-standing members.11) However, some SOEs like four port authorities12) 
have boards of directors composed of only non-standing outsiders, with the 
exception of the CEO. In this case, the board is dominated by outsiders, which makes 
the board much more independent from inside executive managers. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the second option. The mixed composition 
of the Bulgarian public boards is a legal requirement and it is advised by the OECD 
to follow such a procedure for the SOEs as well in order to enhance the objectivity 
of SOE boards. It is important to nominate a sufficient number of competent non-
executive board members who are capable of independent judgment. These board 
members should have the relevant competence and experience and it is advisable 
that they be recruited from the private sector. It will help in making boards more 
business-oriented, particularly for SOEs that operate in competitive markets. Their 
expertise could also include qualifications related to an SOE’s specific obligations and 
policy objectives. Bulgaria may want to expand its public companies’ legislation over 
the SOE and confirm the mixed composition if not the second option. 
3.1.10. Who Appoints Non-standing Board Members?
The appointment process for non-standing board members in Korea is similar to 
the CEO position except that the appointment is made by the MOSF minister, not 
by the President of the Republic of Korea. It is notable that the non-standing board 
members are appointed neither by the relevant minister nor by the CEO of the SOE. 
This is a way to guarantee the objective role of the non-standing board members in 
11) These non-standing members are appointed by the minister for MOSF, and they are supposed to play 
a role in the checks and balances process of board operations.
12) There are four Port Authorities in Korea: Busan, Incheon, Ulsan, Yeosu.
Positive Negative
All insiders (no non-
standing members)
High possibility of collusive 
behavior
CEO is the only inside 
board member
Strong role of the board Burden of the CEO
Mixed composition
Middle of the Road between two extremes
(option 1 and 2)
<Table 1-9> Composition of Board Members
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checking the CEO.13) Standing executive board members are by law supposed to be 
appointed by the CEO, but sometimes this is influenced by the relevant ministers in 
Korea.
Recommendations for Bulgaria somewhere between the first and the second 
option. It is important to change the current practice in which the line ministers 
alone appoint board members, including the CEO, without any prescribed rules and 
requirements. The power of appointment can be shared by the two: a half of non-
standing board members appointed by the central agency, and the other half by the 
line ministry. Alternatively, it may stay with the line minister but the whole process 
can be regulated and supervised by the central agency. In Bulgaria, the nomination 
and selection of all board members should follow same procedure as the CEO. That 
is enforced by the fact that according to commercial law in Bulgaria, all members of 
the board have equal rights and obligations. As in Korea, though contrary to some 
other countries, in Bulgaria the executive director is also a member of the board, and 
the executive director is empowered by the other members of the board to represent 
the company in accordance with the board’s decisions. 
3.2. Policy Tools for SOEs by the Central Agency
The Management Committee (hereafter, the Committee) in Korea has diverse 
leverages on SOEs. This part will investigate whether those policy tools are applicable 
to Bulgaria.
3.2.1. Input Control 
In Korea, the central agency controls the budget, employment, internal 
organization, and remuneration of SOEs in a very tight manner. It is safe to say that 
MOSF controls all those policy tools for the SOE since the MOSF minister is the chair 
of the Management Committee, and since the Secretariat of the Committee is an 
internal organization of MOSF.
13) Insiders are a CEO and standing board members of the SOE who are appointed by the CEO. 
Positive Negative
All insiders (no non-
standing members)
Checks and balances with 
insiders of the board
Time consuming process
CEO is the only inside 
board member
Harmony between SOE and  
the relevant line ministry
Too much influence of  
line ministry on SOE
Mixed composition Autonomy of SOE Weak checks and balances
<Table 1-10> Who Appoints Non-standing Board Members?
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There are three different approaches for input control. First, strict approval may 
be required as in Korea where all the inputs variables are approved by MOSF. Second, 
after basic guidelines are provided, the efficient use of the inputs is assessed by a 
formalized monitoring and evaluation system. Third, we may grant full autonomy to 
the SOE for its inputs when we can enforce an evaluation on its final performance.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the second option. In principle, control over 
input variables is not necessary when the outcome is clearly measured. However, 
since it will take time for the outcome index and strict evaluation system to be 
developed in Bulgaria, controlling inputs makes good sense. However, option one 
appears to involve too much intervention by the central agency. Guidelines coupled 
with ex-post monitoring will be enough to strengthen the efficiency of SOEs. 
With initial guidelines, ex-post monitoring will be much easier. In Bulgaria input 
control is delegated to the line ministry within the framework of the control over 
the business plans implementation. The management of the SOEs is obliged every 
quarter to present written report to the line minister as regards the results of their 
activities in implementing the business plan of the company, the financial situation, 
the weaknesses and the measures undertaken for their resolution.14) The three-year 
business plans have to consist concrete economic indicators. Regulation, though, 
fails to prescribe clearly the compulsory indicators for the performance of SOEs. 
This makes the practice and the assessment very weak. The entire process rests at 
the discretion of the line ministry. The ministries do not set up performance targets. 
Recently the national audit chamber has performed an evaluation of the control 
performed by two ministries on the SOEs’ business plans. The result in both cases 
was worrying. The reports state that there is no internal procedure involving reports 
on neither business plans nor an evaluation of results. The ministries do not prepare 
regular reports on the economic and financial performance of the SOEs under their 
control. 
14) Act 23 of the Regulation for Exercising the Ownership Rights in the Commercial Companies with State 
Participation.
Positive Negative
Approval for major input variables
Tight control of SOE 
efficiency
Lack of autonomy
Setting input guidelines and Ex-post 
monitoring and evaluation for inputs
Harmony between autonomy and efficiency
No ex-ante intervention and Ex-post 
Outcome Evaluation
Autonomy of SOE Possibility of inefficiency
<Table 1-11> How Much to Regulate the Inputs for SOEs?
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3.2.2. Input Regulator
The next question is who should set the input guidelines and conduct ex-post 
monitoring to check whether each SOE satisfied the guidelines. In Korea, the result 
of the monitoring is an important part of the management evaluation that will be 
explained in the next section. There are three options, as follows: the Chairman of 
the Committee, Relevant Line Minister, and Chairman of the Board of each SOE. 
If input control is necessary to enhance the efficiency of SOEs, the central agency’s 
direct involvement is unavoidable. However, SOEs will be seriously resistant to these 
new regulations on their salary, new hires, etc. The decision should be made based 
on this pros and cons for strong input control by the central agency. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option, as practiced in Korea. As long 
as Bulgaria introduces a more centralized governance system, the central agency 
should assume such roles. The second and third options will simply open the door to 
collusive behavior. As was discussed earlier, however, controlling the business plan 
should remain with the line ministries since they do understand the sectors better 
than the central agency. 
3.2.3. Project Control
Normally SOEs’ projects are controlled by the line ministries unless the projects are 
financed by the government. Korea has maintained the division of labor between 
the line ministry (projects and business) and MOSF (management and evaluation). 
However, the line ministry has been inclined to be generous for the new projects of 
SOEs since both the ministry and SOEs have enjoyed the expansion of business even 
when it is not profitable. This collusive behavior resulted in huge debts in many SOEs. 
Therefore, the Korean government recently introduced a pre-feasibility study for SOE 
projects even though they are not financed by the government. The pre-feasibility 
study for government projects has been conducted by the KDI (Korea Development 
Institute) since 1999, and non-budget SOE projects became a recently added 
Positive Negative
Central Agency - Efficiency
- Resistance of the lineministries
- Same treatment for different SOEs
Relevant Line Minister - More information - Possibility ofcollusive behavior
Chairman of Board of 
Directors
- Autonomy of SOEs 
- Flexible management
- If the Board has low accountability, 
serious collusive behavior is expected
<Table 1-12> Who Regulates the Inputs for SOEs?
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mission for the KDI. There are three options for the project intervention by the 
central agency. First, no intervention is called for unless the project is funded by the 
government. Second, even projects funded by a SOE’s own revenue are controlled if 
the amount exceeds US$10 million. Third, one may lower the floor to US$1 million in 
order to control more SOE projects. In Korea, the floor is presently US$50 million.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option one. The line ministers should deal 
with project control and planning when such projects are related to the execution 
of governmental programs and strategies. When the projects are related to 
operational activities, then the management of the company has to have autonomy 
and flexibility. The current practice in Bulgaria is that all investment projects are part 
of the business plan and the line ministry controls their implementation as much 
as it controls the business plan implementation. In cases where the state budget is 
involved, this falls within the EU state aid rules. In order to receive approval, such 
investments follow a strict EU procedure including permission from the European 
Commission. Since the government receives the bulk of the profit (60 to 80 percent) 
there is not much room for large investments by SOEs. There is no risk for over-
expansion. The problem in Bulgaria is just the opposite. The limited investment 
makes SOEs non-competitive and their products and services difficult to penetrate 
the market except in areas where they have monopolistic positions. This is one of the 
reasons for their weak performance. Reforms need to give more room for investment 
by the SOEs. It is not just who is going to control the investment, but how to provide 
opportunities for investment. 
3.2.4. Information Disclosure
Korea has regulated 323 public institutions, including 30 SOEs, to upload their 
managerial information on Alio, an integrated website (www.alio.go.kr). It includes 
37 pieces of information, such the level of employment, salary, budget, fringe 
benefits, debt level, etc. It also provides information on job openings, tenders of 
Positive Negative
(1) Only projects by 
government budget
Autonomy of SOEs Possibility of over-expansion
(1) + any projects with more 
than US$10 million
Target only large projects Few projects are controlled.
(1) + any projects with more 
than US$1 million 
Tight control over SOE 
projects
Loss of autonomy of SOEs
<Table 1-13> Should Projects of SOEs be Controlled by the Committee?
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SOEs, and best practices. The benefit of an integrated system comes from the easy 
comparison of different SOEs. When the integrated website was first opened, 
however, there were many discrepancies between information on Alio, the respective 
internet homepages of each SOE, and the accounting report. Some were simple 
mistakes, but some were intentional. MOSF asks each SOE to punish personnel who 
are responsible for incorrect information being submitted to Alio. MOSF is working 
to improve Alio to the level of the DART (Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer 
System) which is an on-line information disclosure system for private companies listed 
on Korea’s stock market.15) Depending on the level of enforcement, there are four 
approaches. Korea took the first option. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the second option for the time being. 
Bulgarian SOEs are not sufficiently transparent and this is one of the main reasons 
for their weak performance. SOEs should disclose material information on all matters 
prescribed by the best corporate governance practices, while additionally focusing on 
areas of significant concern for the ultimate owner, the general public. This means 
that in addition to the third proposed option, it needs to report to a centralized 
reporting system for public companies, something akin to the Alio system or DART 
in Korea. However, the punishment clause seems to be somewhat excessive since it 
may invite serious resistance from SOEs. As for the legal framework, they are obliged 
to present their annual reports and accounts. Currently, the quarterly reports of SOEs 
with more than 50 percent state participation may be also found in the Ministry of 
Finance web page, but it is neither comprehensive nor accurate. If this is the case 
even after the mandatory information disclosure through an integrated web site, 
Bulgaria can move on to the first option.
15) The DART is managed by Financial Supervisory Service in collaboration with KRX (Korea Exchange). 
For more information on DART, please visit englishdart.fss.or.kr/.
Positive Negative
Integrated website with 
punishment for false info
Strong impact
Burden for SOEs and their 
resistance
Integrated website without 
punishment
Easy implementation Possibility for many false info
Enforce info disclosure thru 
respective internet homepage
Easier implementation
Difficult to compare info of 
different SOEs
Recommend SOEs to list 
information on their homepage
Easiest implementation Weak impact
<Table 1-14> The Enforcement Level of Information Disclosure
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3.2.5. Customer Satisfaction Survey
Every year, all SOEs in Korea should conduct a customer satisfaction survey. In 
order to guarantee the objective survey process, MOSF, not the SOEs, designates one 
consulting company to conduct a survey for all SOEs. Each SOE negotiates with MOSF 
over the definition of customers, the method of the survey, and the questionnaire. 
The result of the survey is one index in a management evaluation that will be 
explained in the next section. 
As the survey has been conducted over the years, almost all SOEs receive a score 
over 90 percent, making the survey lose its differentiating power as an evaluation 
index. Some people say that this is a result of the efforts by SOEs to enhance 
customer satisfaction, but some say that the equally high score for all SOEs is a result 
of customer manipulation. Although both arguments are not wrong, the truth seems 
to lie closer to the positive interpretation: It cannot be denied that the survey has 
contributed to the enhanced satisfaction level of customers. Defining their customers 
and their needs, the questionnaire turned out to be a very educational process for 
SOEs.
Depending on the level of enforcement, there are three options. First is the 
Korean model where the central agency (MOSF) conducts a mandatory customer 
satisfaction survey. Second, each SOE conducts a mandatory customer satisfaction 
survey. Compared to the first option, the second option may end up with less reliable 
results because the survey is conducted by the SOE itself. The third option is a simple 
recommendation to SOEs to initiate a customer satisfaction survey, which may end 
up with no implementation by any SOE. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option one. This will have a strong impact 
and opportunities for comparison between the different SOEs. In Bulgaria there has 
never been a consumer satisfactory survey. There has been a discussion just recently 
about a similar survey to be conducted for health services provided by some of the 
Positive Negative
Mandatory for all SOEs  
conducted by central agency
Strong impact
Cost for the central agency 
(budget, administration)
Mandatory for all SOEs 
conducted by each SOE
Impact with less costs Reliability of the survey result
Simple recommendation for SOEs No conflict No implementation
<Table 1-15> The Level of Enforcement of Customer Satisfaction Survey
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nation’s hospitals. Conducting different surveys for each sector and SOEs, together 
with a different methodology and interpretation of the results, may be harmful. 
Since Bulgaria has no such experience it would be better to start with a more 
uniform approach. This part of the reform is of key importance for overall reforms 
since the public will gain a substantial amount of knowledge and clear opinions 
about the performance of SOEs.
3.2.6. Function Review
In Korea, MOSF regularly reviews the functions of an SOE to see if any should 
be stopped or integrated with another SOE. Many SOEs in Korea have expanded 
their businesses for different reasons. They may want to raise revenue in the market 
even when there are already private providers. When SOEs compete against private 
firms, competitive neutrality is often violated. Sometimes SOEs start a new business 
in the face of unfavorable financial prospect only to expand their employment and 
organization hoping to enjoy speedier promotion. There are also cases where line 
ministries ask for a certain project against the will of the relevant SOE to fulfill their 
policy objectives. As a result, the functions of SOEs are often very much bloated 
and excessive. There are even cases where similar functions are being conducted by 
multiple SOEs. 
There are three different approaches for a function review. First, as in Korea, the 
central agency can review the functions of SOEs annually. Although implementation 
of the review is strongly enforced by the law in Korea, this may not be the case in 
Bulgaria. Second, the central agency can perform a function review sporadically 
right after the new political leadership comes in. This will provide a good political 
environment in dealing with the resistance of SOEs and line ministries. However, a 
sporadic review matching with the political cycle may not allow enough time for 
the examination and analysis of the different functions of SOEs. Some functions 
could be left out of the review due to the time constraints. Third, one may pass the 
responsibility to a line ministry, in which case not much will happen since no one 
wants to fundamentally reform its SOEs. In Korea, MOSF initially followed option 
two, but altered its policy to option one in 2013 to make the function review a more 
continuous process. Every year, MOSF sets areas of priority for the function review. 
During the first half of 2015, 87 public institutions in three focus areas16) had to 
undergo a function review by MOSF. 
16) The three areas were social overhead capital, agriculture and fisheries, and culture and arts. 52 
different functions were streamlined: integrated, reduced, and stopped. There are, however, cases 
where an expansion of a certain function is recommended.
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option. Ministries have no interest in 
initiating the privatization of SOEs. That is why a central agency could take over this 
function. The central agency will have to conduct a regular function review, but may 
stage rather substantial reforms such as privatization of SOEs during the honeymoon 
period of a new government. The line ministries should be asked to propose a 
reform plan of their SOEs, but it is the central agency that approves and makes the 
decision. When the central agency does not have enough staff for the function 
review, it may want to form a taskforce with experts from the private sector and 
academia. However, these experts can provide only knowledge, not a driving force, 
that is essential to overcome the strong resistance from both a ministry and an SOE. 
Therefore, when the central agency is seriously under-staffed, the second option 
could prove more realistic. 
The function review of SOEs in Bulgaria is defined in two legal acts, the 
Commercial Law and the Law on Privatization. The Privatization Agency, which 
reports to Parliament, prepares an annual program where it proposes which SOEs 
have to be offered for privatization. They make their proposal on the grounds of 
their assessment of the functions of the SOEs and also in coordination with the line 
ministries and the Council of Ministers. Once the program is adopted the Agency 
starts the procedure. 
Mergers and acquisitions of SOEs are prescribed in government regulations, 
where the power is clearly divided between the Council of Ministers and the line 
ministries. The current practice does not create substantial problems and there may 
be need for radical reforms. The problem is that the Bulgarian legislation does not 
clearly distinguish between the commercial and the social functions of the SOEs as 
requested by the OECD Guidelines for SOEs management. Such distinctions would 
be beneficial for both remuneration from the budget of the social functions and 
Positive Negative
Continuous process conducted 
by central agency
- High impact
- Large burden for  
the central agency
May not be implemented
- Impact with less 
costs
- Reliability of the survey 
result
At the beginning of a new 
government conducted by central 
agency
- Good political 
support
- Not enough time for 
review
- Some functions are let out.
Leave the function review 
at the hands of line ministry
- Easy 
implementation
- Weak impact
<Table 1-16> The Level of Enforcement of a Function Review
Chapter 1 _ Governance Innovation for SOEs in Bulgaria: Based on the Korean Experience in 31 Questions • 053
also for the facilitation of the decision as to which SOEs should remain state-owned 
and which should be privatized. Such an analysis is also needed when it comes to the 
creation17) of a new SOE to see whether the function it will perform has a social or 
any other public interest. 
3.2.7. Long-term Fiscal Planning: Scope and Enforcement
Every year in Korea, SOEs have to submit their five-year fiscal planning which is 
delivered to National Assembly after being reviewed by MOSF. The first question is 
which SOEs should submit a plan. The central agency may enforce the submission of 
a plan for all SOEs or only for large SOEs,18) or for SOEs with a bad financial status.19) 
Every year, MOSF designates SOEs that are either large or financially bad. However, 
we may have an option where it is simply recommended that SOEs conduct a five-
year fiscal assessment without legal obligation.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option, unlike Korea. The current 
practice in Bulgaria is that the management of SOEs is employed for three years 
(The contracts are for three years). According to Art. 28. (1) of the Regulation for the 
Execution of Property Rights of the State in the SOEs the Board members are obliged 
to prepare a business plan for the entire three-year period and also for each year. The 
business programs shall consist indicators such as productivity, turnover, profitability, 
new markets, equipment, maintaining a certain number of employees, financial 
obligations, investments, etc. The business program is presented to the responsible 
minister for approval. 
17) According to the legislation, the Council of Ministers may create new SOEs. 
18) The size of an SOE in Korea is measured by the amount of assets.
19) This is measured in Korea by the debt/asset ratio.
Positive Negative
Mandatory for all SOEs Simple
Too much work for the 
central agency if the plan 
should be reviewed
Mandatory for large SOEs
Effective Where to draw the line?
Mandatory for financially bad SOEs
Simple recommendation for SOEs Autonomy of SOEs Not much impact
<Table 1-17> Four Ways of Enforcing a 5-year Fiscal Plan for SOEs
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3.2.8. Long-term Fiscal Planning: Involvement of the Central Agency
Another dimension of long-term fiscal planning is whether or not the central 
agency intervenes in the formulation of the plan. When this new regulation was 
first introduced in Korea, MOSF simply accepted the plan which was formulated by 
the SOE and was discussed with the relevant line ministry before being submitted to 
MOSF. As the debt of SOEs became a serious issue, however, MOSF began to deepen 
its involvement since planning was a very useful process in directly changing the 
future financial status of SOEs. However, we can have an option where the central 
agency lets SOEs and their relevant ministry submits their plan directly to Congress. 
Korea’s current practice is option three, which requires substantial human resources 
during a relatively short review period.20) When the initially submitted plan proves 
unsatisfactory, MOSF asks for a revision by an SOE. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option two, with elements of option three. 
Bulgaria may start with the second option, but the central agency can review the 
adequacy of financial plans of selected debt-ridden SOEs. When the financial plan 
is not innovative enough to reduce the high debt of such SOEs, the central agency 
should decisively step in to correct the plan. However, such intervention will require 
more human resources with relevant competency.
3.2.9. More vs. Less Dividend 
The Korean government has maintained a rather low propensity to dividend 
at around 20 percent. Since prior to 2008 the Korean government enjoyed a 
consolidated fiscal surplus, dividends from the SOEs were not important for the 
government. After 2008, however, the debt of SOEs soared, reducing the dividend 
capacity of SOEs. As the debt situation has stabilized, the Korean government plans 
20) MOSF works with Research Center for SOEs established under Korea Institute for Public Finance.
Positive Negative
SOE → Parliament - Accountability of SOEs - Limitation of self-reform
SOE → line ministry → Parliament
- Accountability of line 
ministries
- Collusive behavior
SOE → line ministry → 
central agency → Parliament
- Possibility of Reform
- Too much work for the 
central agency
- Could be ineffective process 
if the central agency is not 
powerful enough
<Table 1-18> Three Ways of Reviewing 5-Year Fiscal Planning of SOEs
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to increase the propensity to dividend to 40 percent by 2020. 
MOSF divides all SOEs into four different groups depending on the ratio of self-
generated revenue. Then, to finalize the dividend ratio, MOSF applies index such as 
profit ratio, debt ratio, reserve ratio, and government support. What is the optimal 
dividend ratio is not an easy question to answer. This paper suggests a higher ratio 
than Korea’s current level of 21.5 percent because higher dividends will enforce the 
motivation of the government to increase the profits of SOEs and eventually to list 
the SOEs in the stock market. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option. The propensity to dividend 
in Bulgaria has been extremely high, reaching 80 percent. Only recently was it 
decreased to 50 percent. The dividend policy of Bulgaria has two problems: (i) the 
uncertainty about how much the budget will take in the next year, which makes it 
difficult for SOEs to plan for business and investment, and (ii) the huge propensity to 
dividend. By all standards, the Bulgarian practice is irrelevant for the development 
of SOEs. First, unlike Korea, the dividend ratio should be lowered. Bulgaria should 
adopt a dividend policy which takes into account the conditions of each company 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Government investment (US$1 billion) 55.6 59.0 60.5 61.1 61.5 61.7
Dividend (US$1 billion) 0.34 0.20 0.43 0.60 0.49 0.33
Rate of Return on Investment (%) 0.60 0.34 0.72 0.99 0.80 0.53
Propensity to Dividend (%)  
= Dividend/Net profit
19.8 20.2 20.4 24.2 21.5
<Table 1-19> Propensity to Dividend in Korea
Source: MOSF Press Release.
Positive Negative
Lower than 
now
- SOEs can use more reserves for 
investment
- SOEs’ stronger motivation for 
profits
• Government’s weaker motivation
   - to list SOEs in the stock market
   - to see more profits of the SOE
Higher than 
now
• Govt’s stronger motivation
   - to list SOEs in the stock market
   - to see more profits of the SOE
- SOEs’ less reserves forinvestment
- SOEs’ weaker motivation for profits
<Table 1-20> The Level of Propensity to Dividend
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and its growth possibilities. The policy goal should escape from securing additional 
income for the central budget. Second, the dividend ratio should be predictable. 
Korea’s way of calculating dividend ratio is one good example. All those issues have 
to be agreed in the Central Steering Committee and then adopted in the three-year 
fiscal plan. 
4. Evaluation System for Better Performance of 
SOEs in Bulgaria
Management evaluation of SOEs is one of the most influential policy tools for 
the central agency in Korea. Evaluations have been conducted since 1984, and the 
backbone of the system has been maintained without much change. The efficiency 
and good performance of Korea’s SOEs can be credited to this evaluation system.
4.1. Evaluation System
4.1.1. Who Should be Evaluated: Type of Organizations
Korea evaluates both SOEs and QGOs. Out of 323 public institutions, all 30 SOEs 
and 90 QGOs are evaluated by the central agency, leaving 203 small QGOs being 
evaluated by line ministries based on a much simpler method. Evaluating SOEs is 
easier than QGOs since performance of SOEs can be easily measured by a quantitative 
index such as net profits. Including QGOs requires a much larger evaluation team 
and involves more costs.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option two. While Korea’s central agency 
is undergoing huge financial and time costs in dealing with 120 organizations, 157 
SOEs for the Bulgarian central agency is a considerably large group for evaluation. 
This is why the third option is not realistic. However, all SOEs should be evaluated 
by one single system, if not, the central management will lose its ground, and this 
Positive Negative
Only large SOEs
- Easier to get a consensus
- Less financial and time cost
- Inefficiency of QGOs
All but only SOEs - Same rule for all SOEs - Large burden for evaluation
All SOEs and QGOs - QGOs will be more efficient.
- QGOs are more difficult to evaluate
- Serious financial and time costs
<Table 1-21> Scope of Organizations for the Centralized Evaluation System
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is why the first option should not be selected. An evaluation system will not be 
effective without clear consequences. A universal evaluation system for all SOEs is a 
foundation for the universal consequences attached to its result. There is, of course, 
a need for reducing the burden to the central agency, which will be discussed in the 
following. 
 
4.1.2. Evaluator in Charge
Which ministry should be in charge of the evaluation? There are three options. 
The central agency is the first option, and the second is a line ministry. The third 
option is evaluation by the line ministry which is examined and corrected by the 
central agency. This type of two-layer evaluation system is often found in the 
performance management system in the Korean government. The third option is 
useful when the line ministries have more essential information than the central 
agency, and when there is not much room for discretionary evaluation by line 
ministries.
Recommendations for Bulgaria are a combination of the first and third option. 
We should not just leave the evaluation in the hands of the line ministry as is 
the current standing, which has already been proven problematic. It is therefore 
recommended that the first option be followed where the central agency is in charge 
of the evaluation. However, it will be difficult for the central agency to evaluate 
all SOEs in Bulgaria. Therefore, some of the evaluation can be delegated to line 
ministries. The next issue pertains to the division of labor between the central and 
line ministry.
Positive Negative
Central Agency
- Objective and Time saving
- More power to central agency
- Too much work
- Resistance from line ministries
Line ministry
- More information
- Accountability of ministries
- Collusive behavior
Evaluation by line 
ministries is  
re-evaluated by  
central agency
- Double check
- Participation of line ministries
- Expensive
- Re-evaluation creates more 
conflicts with line ministries
<Table 1-22> Who Should be in Charge of Evaluation?
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4.1.3. Division of Roles between the Central Agency and  
Line Ministries
In terms of their roles in evaluating SOEs, there are two ways of drawing the line 
between the central agency and line ministry. In the first case, the central agency 
designates and evaluates around 30 out of 157 SOEs using criteria such as volume 
of revenue, size of assets, or the volume of liability. Though the same evaluation 
methods and criteria should be applied to all SOEs, relatively smaller SOEs are 
evaluated by line ministries and then if necessary checked and amended by the 
central agency. The central agency can focus on 30 SOEs with major implications for 
the national economy. When the central agency is equipped with more staff and 
resources, it can designate more SOEs under its direct evaluation. The problem with 
this option is whether or not we can trust the evaluation by the line ministries. If 
there is no such trust, the central agency will have to repeat the evaluation process 
for the remaining 127 SOEs, which will be a very costly process.
The second option is to draw the line depending on an evaluation index: a 
qualitative one which is a more subjective evaluation by the central agency, and a 
quantitative one, which is a more objective evaluation by the line ministries. Since 
there is little room for discretion in the quantitative evaluation, the central agency 
can better trust the evaluation by line ministries than in the first option. Since both 
the central agency and the line ministry evaluate all SOEs, there are times when the 
evaluations by two parties may be very different. Integrating the two evaluations 
should be done by the central agency.
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the second option. By providing specific 
guidelines for quantitative evaluation, the central agency can minimize the collusive 
behavior of the line ministries. The line ministries will be relatively more receptive to 
Positive Negative
Large SOEs by the Center
Others by line ministries*
- Focus on Big Fish
- Easy adjustment of workload 
by the Center
- How to compareresults 
by two organizations
- Collusive behavior
Qualitative index by the Center
Quantitative index by line 
ministries
- Universal treatment for SOEs
- Utilize better knowledge of 
line ministries
- Less resistance from line 
ministries
- A heavy burden for the 
central agency
<Table 1-23> Division of Roles between the Central Agency and Line Ministries
Note: * The evaluation by line ministries will be checked and subject to change by the central agency. 
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the evaluation reform initiative under the second option since they can share power 
with the central agency. The consumer satisfaction survey may have to be conducted 
by the central agency although it is a quantitative index. The central agency can 
conserve resources in the evaluation by utilizing the expertise of the line ministries. 
The only problem left is the large burden of the central agency which can be handled 
in the following manner.
4.1.4. Implementation of the Evaluation: External Experts vs. 
Government Staff
Another issue pertains to who actually conducts an evaluation. In Korea, MOSF 
organizes the evaluation taskforce, which is composed of mostly professors and 
certified public accountants. The number of members in the evaluation team 
ranges around 150, and approximately 30 percent of members change every year 
in order to minimize any collusive behavior between team members and the SOEs. 
Since the evaluation takes place mostly from March –through May, the taskforce is 
appropriate in order to complete the work in a short period of time. However, some 
team members are occasionally criticized for their superficial understanding of SOEs. 
An alternative option is an evaluation by government officials in the central agency. 
This is an effective way to maintain the quality and consistency of the evaluation. 
However, this may also entail collusive behavior between the central agency and the 
SOEs. Another problem is the concentrated workload of those government officials 
during a specific period of the year. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is the first option. As previously stated, one of 
the main weakness in SOEs is insufficient transparency. One of the powerful tools to 
make an evaluation more independent and at the same time build public confidence 
in the performance of SOEs is to open the evaluation to external experts. Taking into 
consideration that around 150 experts are actively engaged in Korea’s evaluation 
process for three months, option two is not realistic for the current state of human 
resources for Bulgaria’s central agency. The first option will, however, create a lot of 
Positive Negative
Expert Taskforce
- More neutrality and independence
- Easy to conduct in a short period 
of time
- Lower expertise in some cases
- Increased costs
Government 
Staff
- Higher expertise after a certain 
period
- Higher accountability
- Possibility of collusion
- Uneven annual workload
<Table 1-24> Who Actually Conducts an Evaluation?
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resistance from the ministries and political powers that will see their influence on 
SOEs decline. One of the arguments against this approach will be the complications 
in selecting external evaluators21) and garnering financial resources22) to hire and 
implement external experts. 
4.1.5. Which Should be Evaluated: The CEO or SOE?
Should we evaluate the SOE as an organization or the CEO as an individual? 
Korea evaluates both because the performance of an SOE and its CEO are not 
necessarily correlated. A first-rate CEO cannot perform well in a hopeless SOE such as 
the Korea Coal Corporation (KCC). Since the coal industry is on the decline in Korea, 
no amount of genius in management can improve the negative financial status of 
the KCC. On the other hand, a hopelessly incompetent CEO who works for a well-
established SOE may have a high score in the evaluation thanks to all the managerial 
and technological systems in place. 
What should be evaluated depends on the consequences of the evaluation. If an 
annual performance bonus for each staff member is a result of the evaluation, the 
SOE should be evaluated. However, CEO should be tested if personnel decision for 
CEO such as discharge, reappointment is the consequence of the evaluation. In Korea 
both the SOE and CEO are evaluated because this has consequences for both staff 
and the CEO. Another issue is correlation: If the performance of the SOE and the 
CEO are closely correlated in Bulgaria, and if the CEO can influence the salary level of 
each employee, the central agency can evaluate only the CEO since a well-motivated 
CEO can change his or her own SOE. 
21) Many professors and public accountants seek to join the evaluation taskforce in Korea. The member of 
the taskforce can expect the following benefits: an opportunity to learn about insider information on 
SOEs, networking with SOEs, and a substantial evaluation fee. The central agency (MOSF) designates 
the head of the taskforce along with the other members.
22) It takes US$ 2 million for an annual evaluation in Korea, which is mostly spent on fees for the 150 
members of the taskforce.
Positive Negative
SOE as an 
organization
- Good for changing staff in an SOE
- Is the CEO responsible? (A bad CEO 
in a well-established SOE or vice 
versa)
CEO as an 
individual
- Good for personnel decisionsby 
CEO
- Easy to implement
- Can we motivate staff in each SOE?
SOE and CEO - Powerful
- Redundancy
- More costly
<Table 1-25> Who Should be Evaluated?
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is option three, as is the case in Korea. Instead 
of the current indirect evaluation of CEOs in Bulgaria, there is a need for a full-
fledged evaluation procedure criteria and results, including dismissal for the worst 
performers. The legal framework for the evaluation is rather different from current 
practices in Bulgaria. Management is an indirect subject of evaluation when the 
business plan is annually evaluated. Also, management shall be evaluated for the 
purposes of setting salaries. According to the Council of Ministers Regulation Art. 
33. (1) the remuneration of the managers depends on: long-term assets, the number 
of personnel, profitability, financial results, the change of the value added per 
employee, debt service, as well as other obligations as per the management contract. 
The monthly salaries should be based on an integral score of the indicators for the 
last quarter. In practice, though, this is not strictly followed. The regulations also 
stipulate the scope and the basis for the calculation of bonuses. The SOE performance 
in Bulgaria should also be evaluated according to Regulation 114/2010.
4.1.6. Implementation of SOE and CEO Evaluation
If both SOEs and CEOs are evaluated, should there be two separate taskforces 
or can just one taskforce cover both? Korea once divided the taskforce into two in 
order to ensure the accuracy of the CEO’s evaluation, which would then be used for 
re-appointment. However, this bifurcation incurred more costs, and there was some 
redundancy in the process. Korea now utilizes only one taskforce to evaluate both 
SOEs and CEOs. 
The next question is which evaluation is a subset of which. If the CEO evaluation 
is subset of the SOE evaluation, the results of the CEO evaluation will be one part 
of the SOE evaluation meaning that the SOE evaluation has more indexes. The 
rationale for this option is that CEO leadership is also a factor in SOE performance. 
Since the result of the SOE evaluation determines the compensation of employees in 
Korea, when the CEO evaluation is poor, the employees may complain as to why they 
should be penalized by the performance of a poor CEO whom they did not appoint. 
The other option is to make an SOE evaluation a subset of the CEO evaluation, which 
makes sense since the CEO should be responsible for the performance of his or her 
SOE. In this case, there still remains the issue of an unclear correlation between SOE 
performance and CEO competency. In addition, employees may not pay a great 
deal of attention to the exclusive index of their CEO since their annual bonuses are 
already determined by the SOE evaluation.
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is option three, unlike Korea’s selection of 
option two. The performance of the CEO’s SOE is the most important evaluation 
criteria for the CEO. Compared to Korea, SOEs in Bulgaria are relatively more 
autonomous in their policies on service and pricing, and CEO competency is more 
closely correlated with SOE performance. Although there is the possibility that the 
employees are not helpful to their CEO in preparation for the ‘other index’ of the 
evaluation, this poses no significant problem when the other indexes are properly 
selected, and when the CEO can effectively control his or her staff.
4.1.7. Frequency
How often should we evaluate SOEs? The first option is an annual evaluation, 
which is practiced in Korea. However, this option is criticized not only by SOEs but 
also by scholars for two reasons: It encourages CEOs to have a myopic one-year 
horizon, as well as being a burden for SOEs. The second option is therefore once in 
every three years, which matches the CEO’s term in office. Korea’s MOSF defends 
the annual option on the grounds that option two makes it difficult to set annual 
bonuses for SOE employees based on the results of the evaluation. MOSF also wants 
to penalize SOE wrongdoings or incompliance through annual evaluations, as 
opposed to having to wait for two more years. The third option is a combination of 
the first two options: The central agency conducts a full scale evaluation every three 
years, but applies a simplified23) evaluation annually for the first two years: Full scale - 
simple – simple – full scale – simple – simple – full scale – etc. 
23) One example of a simplified evaluation focuses on a quantitative evaluation for an input category.
Rationale Criticism
Two separate 
evaluations and teams
- More thorough evaluation of 
the CEO
- Redundancy in evaluation 
index
- More costs
CEO evaluation +  
more index
= SOE evaluation
- Leadership of CEO is one input 
for the SOE’s performance
- Why should employees be 
responsible for a bad CEO?
SOE evaluation +  
more index
= CEO evaluation
- CEO should be responsible for 
the SOE evaluation
- Why should a CEO be 
responsible for ahopeless 
SOE?
- Staff may not be keen about a 
‘more index’ CEO evaluation.
<Table 1-26> How to Evaluate both the SOE and CEO?
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is the third option. The status quo in Bulgaria, 
which is to have a remuneration related evaluation each quarter, simply does not 
work. It needs to introduce the annual staff bonuses. The annual bonus in a year 
of a simplified evaluation can be calculated by a weighted average of a full scale 
evaluation and a simplified one.24) Option three is also useful to reduce the burden 
on the central agency. By dividing 157 SOEs into three groups, the central agency can 
focus on a full-scale evaluation of 52 SOEs annually, which is much more manageable. 
On the other hand, the line ministries will have to conduct an evaluation every year. 
24) One example is as follows. An annual bonus for 2017 is based 100% on a full scale evaluation of the 
2016 performance conducted in 2017. An annual bonus for 2018 is based on a full scale evaluation 
conducted in the previous year (60%), the simplified evaluation for 2017 as conducted in 2018 (40%). 
An annual bonus for 2019 is based on a full scale evaluation conducted two years prior (40%), a 
simplified evaluation for 2018 conducted in 2019 (60%).
Positive Negative
Every year
- Prompt feedback
- Easy for setting annual bonu
- Myopic horizon of CEOs
- Burden on SEOsHigh cost
Every 3 years
- Longer term horizon
- Match with CEO’s term
- Less burden for central 
agency
- Slow feedback so less 
discipline of SOEs
Comprehensive: every 3 
years
Simple scale: 1st, 2nd year
- Combination of the first and second options
- Simple scale: only quantitative evaluation (by line ministry) 
- Comprehensive: quantitative + qualitative (by central agency)
<Table 1-27> Frequency of Evaluation
Annual Bonus of Comprehensive Evaluation (2017)
Simplified 
evaluation
Evaluation is based 
on performance of
2017
(comprehensive evaluation)
100% - 2016
2018
(simplified)
60% (2017) 40% (2018) 2017
2019
(simplified)
40% (2017) 60% (2019) 2018
<Table 1-28> Criteria of an Annual Bonus (example)
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4.1.8. Consequences
The secret behind more than 30 years of history of the evaluation system in Korea 
lies in the harsh consequences of the evaluation. There are three consequences of 
the evaluation. 
First, MOSF recommends to the President of Korea a discontinuation of the 
contract with the CEO if the CEO gets the lowest grade E out of six levels of S, A, B, C, D, 
E. If one receives a D, he or she will be warned by the central agency. If one is warned 
two years in a row, he or she will be recommended to be discharged as well.
Second, each and every SOE employee will receive an annual bonus payment 
depending on the results of the evaluation. Prior to the Korean government giving 
this annual bonus based on the results of an evaluation, each SOE used to pay annual 
bonuses mainly based on seniority. The government, however, passed a law that the 
total volume of annual bonuses must depend on the results of the evaluation. Each 
SOE employee with an S grade will receive an annual bonus equal to 250 percent 
of their monthly basic salary, but one working for SOEs with a D or E grade will end 
up with 0 percent. For instance, if one’s basic monthly salary is US$2,000; the annual 
bonus will range from US$0 to US$5,000 depending on the evaluation results. 
The third consequence of the evaluation is the increase rate of non-payroll 
expenses for each SOE. Non-payroll expenses include travel, maintenance costs, 
office appliances, costs for gatherings, and other miscellaneous expenses. Although 
this is not a substantial part of the budget, it has a certain influence on the smooth 
operation of the SOE. This is why all employees and CEOs of SOEs in Korea are so 
keen about their management evaluation. Based on the three consequences that are 
applied in Korea, we can postulate the following five combination of consequences. 
Grade (1) CEO Re-appointment
(2) Annual Bonus of 
Each Employee
(3) Non-payroll Expense 
Budget for Each SOE
S No official consequence
(only unofficial recognition by 
President)
250%
Increase up to 1%
A 200%
B 150%
Unchanged
C 100%
D Warning
0% Decrease up to 1%
E Recommended to be discharged
<Table 1-29> Three Consequences of Management Evaluation in Korea
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is option four, unlike Korea. Current policies 
in Bulgaria do not envisage consequences from the CEO evaluation other than a 
change in salary and the bonus. And even for defining the salary, the rules do not 
fully work. From that prospective, introducing a full-fledged evaluation system with 
well-defined and harsh consequences will be a very radical change. The CEO re-
appointment and annual bonus of each employee seem to be very useful leverage. 
However, the inclusion of the non-payroll expense budget as a consequence appears 
to be too much intervention in the Bulgarian context where SOEs’ budgets are 
formulated based on their own revenue.
 
4.2. Evaluation Methods
4.2.1. Relative vs. Absolute Evaluation
In a relative evaluation, the central agency needs to provide an ordering in the 
evaluation results of different SOEs. Since it is very difficult to compare different 
SOEs, an absolute evaluation is in general a more ideal way of evaluation. However, 
an absolute evaluation may provide overly generous results for all SOEs. Korea’s 
evaluation is in principle based on absolute criteria. In reality, however, quantitative 
indexes follow absolute criteria, whereas non-quantitative indexes tend to follow 
relative criteria. The final grade also tends to follow a relative evaluation with a 
certain curve. The distribution for the past years is as follows: S (less than 1%), A 
(around 15%), B (around 40%), C (around 30%), D (around 10%), E (4–% to 5%). 
Positive Negative
CEO
Re-appointment only
CEO’s accountability
Staff and labor union may not 
be interested in the evaluation.
Annual bonus of 
employees in SOEs 
only
Attract SOE employees’ attention Resistance from labor union
Non-payroll
Expense
Incentive for the organizational 
level
Lower autonomy of SOEs
CEO and Annual 
Bonusof Employees
Good pressure for both CEO and 
employees
Resistance from SOEs
All three
(Korea’s case)
Most tight control Too much intervention
<Table 1-30> Consequences of the Evaluation
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is the third option, as in Korea. The evaluation 
should be completed using absolute criteria, but the final grade should be given 
based on a certain curve. Without such a distribution, the evaluation could be all 
too generous without providing much by way of differentiated consequences. This 
will be the case in Bulgaria which has not yet experienced such an evaluation system 
which enforces harsh consequences.
4.2.2. Grouping of SOEs for Relative Evaluation
The curve distribution of the final grade inevitably entails a grouping issue. Korea 
divides all public institutions under evaluation into three groups: SOEs (30), large 
QGOs (around 30), and small QGOs (around 60). Size-based grouping makes sense 
because a large SOE has as many as 30 full time staff to prepare for the evaluation 
whereas a small SOE has only three members for the same job. Since all 30 SOEs are 
in one pool for grade distribution, there are many complaints from smaller SOEs. In 
the past, however, the grouping was made based on functional similarities such as an 
SOE group for social overhead capital, fund management, etc. 
Positive Negative
Relative
- Easy to evaluate
- Maximizecompetition
- Controversy for unequal footing
- Apple to apple comparison?
Absolute - Ideal way
- Undifferentiated generous result
- Difficult to evaluate
Mix - Absolute evaluation in principle but with a distribution of the final grade
<Table 1-31> Evaluation Criteria
Positive Negative
All SOEs in one group - Big pool for a curve
- Most difficult to compare
- Many complaints from SOEs
Grouping depending 
on size
- Fair in terms of the capacity 
of an SOE preparing for 
evaluation
- Difficult to compare
Grouping depending 
on functions
- Easy to compare
- Insufficient number of SOEs in 
a group
<Table 1-32> Grouping for Distribution of Final Grade
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The recommendation for Bulgaria is option two and option three. Bulgaria has 
68 state hospitals and 29 district water supply SOEs. Each can be a group within 
which the SOEs are relatively compared for distribution of final grades. Another 60 
SOEs have a wide variety of sizes. While some enterprises in the service sector are 
composed of 10 to 50 employees, others employ thousands. That is why grouping on 
the size could be also a good solution: The 60 SOEs can be divided into two based on 
their size of employment and revenue. Then, there will be four groups of SOEs: 68 
hospitals, 29 district water supply SOEs, around 30 small SOEs, and around 30 large 
SOEs. If the hospitals have a wide range of sizes, we may divide the hospitals into 
two groups as well. As was discussed in Question 26 on frequency, a comprehensive 
evaluation will take place once every three years. The following is one example of 
a cycle of comprehensive evaluation: the hospital group (68 SOEs) in the first year, 
water supply group (29 SOEs) and the 30 small SOEs in the second year, around 30 
large SOEs in the third year. This kind of allocation will evenly distribute the work 
load of the central agency over a 3-year period.
4.2.3. Evaluation Indexes
There are two dimensions regarding the issue of indexes: whether to evaluate 
(1) all input, process, performance aspects of an SOE management, and (2) by a 
quantitative or non-quantitative index. The following are the current indexes in 
Korea. As you can see, all three aspects of management are evaluated with more 
emphasis (70%) on quantitative methods. Input and process indexes are the same for 
all SOEs, whereas the performance indexes are all different for each SOE. 
Quantitative 70% Non-Quantitative 30%
In-put
Labor and asset productivity
Budget and financial management
Remuneration and performance 
management
Labor relation
Same 
indexes for 
all SOEs 
(60%)
Process Customer satisfaction survey result*
Leadership (vision...)
Board of Directors
Transparency and ethics
Social responsibilities
Performance
Core business 1 (performance index)
Core business 2 (performance index)
Core business 3 (performance index)
Core business 4 (performance index)
-
Different 
index for 
each SOE 
(40%)
<Table 1-33> Evaluation Indexes in Korea
Note: * As was discussed in Question 22, the survey may have to be conducted by the central agency although it is 
a quantitative index.
068 • 2015/16 Knowledge Sharing Program with Bulgaria
The evaluation index, as based on two dimensions, can be categorized into the 
following four options. One may say that performance should be the only domain 
under evaluation. However, if the evaluation omits an input index, SOEs may become 
a good service provider with a bad financial statement, which is often the case with 
many SOEs in Bulgaria. The process index should measure customer satisfaction, anti-
corruption, social responsibility, etc. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option one, as in Korea. This corresponds 
with the proposal to introduce a customer satisfaction survey in Bulgaria. As far as 
the composition of the criteria is concerned, the emphasis should be on quantitative 
indicators. The Korean model includes the CEO’s leadership in the process domain, 
but Bulgaria can isolate the CEO evaluation from the SOE evaluation as was 
recommended in Question 25. It also recommendable for Bulgaria to give more 
weight to quantitative indexes as Korea does since it will enhance the level of 
acceptance by SOEs, which will be even more the case in Bulgaria if the quantitative 
evaluation is conducted by each line ministry as was recommended in Question 22. 
4.2.4. How to Set Targets
For an absolute quantitative evaluation, there should be a target because an 
evaluation is made depending on the rate of achievement to the target. Since input 
and process indexes are identically applied to all SOEs, the same target level is given 
for all SOEs. However, since the performance indexes are different across SOEs, each 
index of an SOE needs to have its own target. This leads to the question of how to 
set the target in this case. 
The first method adopted by Korea is forward induction based on past 
performance. The evaluation taskforce measures standard deviation of the past 
three years of the performance index of an SOE, and assigns grade A if the SOE 
outperforms previous year’s index by more than the standard deviation. If the SOE 
maintains the previous year’s performance level, grade C will be given. This method 
is a way to provide constant pressure on SOEs for better performance, which could, 
on the other hand, be too demanding on them because maintaining the status quo 
More Quantitative More Non-quantitative
All three domains input, 
process, performance
Option 1 (Korea) Option 2
Performance + input or process Option 3 Option 3
<Table 1-34> Four Options of Evaluation Index
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means C (around lower 44%). 
The second method is a groperformance of foreign SOEs in the same business. For 
instance, the ACI25) average score of the performance of the world’s top 3 airports 
is set to be the upper target and the ACI average score of all the world’s airports 
is the lower target. If Incheon International Airport exceeds the upper target, 
grade A is given, but if it falls below the lower target, it will get a D. This method 
is effective in that it uses an easy and unquestionable target, but one may argue 
that two SOEs in different countries cannot be compared. Another problem is that 
once an SOE reaches the top of the world level, there is no more pressure. After 
2010 Korea applied this method for some years, but soon dropped it because almost 
all SOEs received full marks with this global performance index. The third method 
25) ACI stands for Airports Council International.
Grade Distribution* Standard for Each Grade
S 1% P(16) > P(15) + 2б
A 15% P(15) + б < P(16) ≤ P(15) + 2б
B 40% P(15) < P(16) ≤ P(15) + б
C 30% P(16) = P(15)
D 10% P(15) - б ≤ P(16) < P(15)
E 4% P(16) < P(15) - б
<Table 1-35> Standard for Each Grade
Note: 1) P(16): Performance of 2016, P(15): Performance of 2015.
  б: standard deviation of the performance index over the past three years.
 2) * This is an average of recent years. No written regulation on the distribution of final grades.
Positive Negative
Based on the past 
performance
- Continuous pressure for 
improvement
- Fatigue of SOEs
Global comparison
- Unquestionable standard
- Easy to find the target
- No pressure once you reach the top
- Can we compare SOEs in different 
countries
- Availability of information
Based on the future 
goal
- Future-oriented
- Difficulties in setting the future goal
- Asymmetry of information between 
the central agency and SOE.
<Table 1-36> Three Ways to Set the Target
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is backward induction: First, set the strategic long-term goal of 5–10 years mostly 
benchmarking foreign companies, and then determining the next year’s target as 
a first step towards the long-term goal. Although this method provides a future 
oriented perspective, it creates another difficult question of setting the future target. 
The recommendation for Bulgaria is option one, as in Korea. Bulgarian SOEs are 
experienced in setting target based on the past performance. Introduction of this 
tool would be easier than the other options. In addition, information to apply this 
tool is accessible which is not the case of other options.
5. Conclusion
The SOE management system in Korea has given too much power to the central 
governance agency (MOSF), leaving little managerial autonomy for SOEs. Although 
their performance is very high by global standards, their efficiency has a good deal of 
room for improvement. It seems like Bulgarian SOEs, on the other hand, are enjoying 
much more autonomy and flexibility, but their performance and efficiency is still not 
very positive. Therefore, a number of modifications should be made in formulating 
Bulgaria’s own governance model for SOEs based on Korea’s experience since the 
two countries have a very different status quo and since the Korean model has many 
problems as well. Out of the 31 The recommendation for Bulgaria is this paper, only 
11 recommendations are currently in practice in Korea.
The directions of SOE governance reforms in the two countries are in this respect 
very different. Korea needs to reduce government intervention by guaranteeing 
more autonomy of SOEs. On the other hand, Bulgaria needs to start institutional 
reforms. As a first step it could create a Steering Committee and a Secretariat that 
Bulgaria now Korea
Governing Body Line ministries Central agency, MOSF
Autonomy of SOEs High Low
Overall Performance Low High
Overall Efficiency Low Medium
Direction of Reform
More control over SOEs by the 
central agency
More autonomy of SOEs 
by reducing government 
intervention
<Table 1-37> Comparison of SOE Management Systems
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will coordinate, design and control SOEs’ policies. To accommodate the voice of 
the line ministries, it is recommendable that a committee composed of line vice-
ministers and experts from academia and the private sector be established. Together 
with institutional reforms, Bulgaria needs to strengthen the transparency and 
accountability of SOEs as well as setting up a comprehensive but also working system 
for the evaluation of both SOEs and CEOs. In line with the Korean experience, the 
2015 OECD guidelines for the SOEs should be implemented. 
The future of the governance model for Bulgaria can be called a “collaborative 
governance” between the line ministries and the newly-created central agency, 
whereas the current Korean model is more a ‘centralized governance.’ In many 
respects, the Bulgaria’s future seems like Korea’s future as well.
Bulgaria now: 
Weak Governance
Bulgaria’s future: 
Collaborative 
Governance
Korea now: 
Centralized 
Governance
Governing 
structure
Line ministries
Partially Centralized 
system
Centralized system
Centralbody -
Steering Committee 
with its own Secretariat
Steering Committee 
with MOSF
CEO appointment Line minister
Political leader or Line 
minister
Political leader
Inputcontrol None
Ex ante guideline 
followed by 
monitoring
Tight ex ante control
Project control None All by line ministry
Major projects by the 
central agency
Evaluation in 
charge
None
Central agency and 
line ministries
Central agency
Frequency of 
evaluation
- Once every three years Every year
Consequence of 
evaluation
None
- CEO reappointment
- Annual bonus
- CEO reappointment
- Annual bonus
- Non-payroll expense
<Table 1-38> Future of Bulgaria’s SOE Governance System
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These reforms will take a lot of effort and strategy. The following steps will have 
to be pursued. The recommendations will have to be presented to the Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Economy for their consideration. As requested by the MOF, 
the proposal to create a united body for the governance of SOEs will be provided 
together with the arguments and a necessary analysis. A discussion as regards 
possible legal changes will have to be made. Policy tools such as customer satisfaction 
surveys, evaluations, and an integrated information disclosure system will be 
organized. Most of all, it is important to win the minds of the people and political 
leadership in that the current system has a number of problems, and that reform of 
the system is critical to a more efficient economy and better service to citizens. 
Chapter 1 _ Governance Innovation for SOEs in Bulgaria: Based on the Korean Experience in 31 Questions • 073
References
Dinavo, Jacques V. Privatization in Developing Countries; Its Impact on Economic 
Development and Democracy. 1995. 
Keremidchiev, Sp. “State and Main Characteristics of the Privatisation Process in Bulgaria.” 
Sociological Problems 4, 1993: 30-42, 1993. (in Bulgarian)
Kim, Hyunsok, Gaesung Park, and Jin Park, Self-Criticism on Government Reform. Seoul: 
Parkyoungsa, 2006. (in Korean)
Kotter John P. Leading Change. Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
Ministry of Planning and Budget, How Korea Reformed the Public Sector, 2002.
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Press Release, 2008.8.11
Park, Jin, “Solutions to Liability of SOEs,” Assessment of Korea’s Fiscal Soundness and Policy 
Agenda, edited by Sungtae Kim and Jin Park), KDI, 2015. (in Korean)
     , “The Role of State-Owned Enterprise,” Korean Experience in Providing 
Infrastructure to Promote Economic Development, edited by Kyungwook Hur, KDI 
School, 2014. 
    , Public Sector Reform, Overcoming the 1997-98 Crisis, edited by Koh, Youngsun, 
Knowledge Sharing program, Ministry of Strategy and Finance, KDI, 2010.
    , “Lessons from SOE Management and Privatization in Korea.”, KDIS working paper 
09-16, 2009.
    , “Comparison of Two Government Reforms,” co-authored with Jong-In Yoon, 
Transforming Korean Public Governance, OECD/Korea Policy Centre, 2008.
Park, Jin, et al. Analysis on the Market Participation Function of Public Institutions, Korea 
Institute for Public Finance, 2013. (in Korean)
    , Analysis on Potential Risk of Public Institutions and Policy Agenda, Korea Institute 
for Public Finance, 2012. (in Korean)
Tchipev, P. D. “Bulgarian Mass Privatisation Scheme: Implications on Corporate Governance.” 
Journal of Economic Studies 30, Number 3/4, 2003: 351-388.
Tchipev, P. D. “Corporate Governance in Bulgaria’s Accession to the EU: Corporate Boards 
Perspective.” Economic Studies 17-2: 152-181
Parker, David and David Saal, International Handbook on Privatization, 2003.
Martin, Stephen and David Parker, The Impact of Privatization; Ownership and Corporate 
Performance in the UK, 1997. 
Abu Shair, Osama J. A. R. Privatization and Development, 1997.
074 • 2015/16 Knowledge Sharing Program with Bulgaria
Appendix
Appendix 1: List of SOEs in Bulgaria with more than 50% 
State Participation
NAME LINE MINISTER FUNCTION
Bulgarian Export Insurance Agency Pls
Minister of Economy
Export Insuarance
LB Bulgaricum Pls Milk Processing and production
KINTEX Pls Exporter of military equipment
National Company Industrial Zones Pls Industrial park
VMZ Pls Production of military equipment
Sofia Tech Park JSC Innovation
Bulgarian Energy Holding Pls and it's 
subsidiary companies:
KOZLODUY NPP Pls
National Electric Company Pls
Electricity system Operator Pls
Mini Maritsa Iztok Pls
TPP MaritsaEast 2 Pls
Bulgargaz Pls
Bulgartransgaz Pls
Minister of Energy Energy sector
Holding BDZ Pls
Minister of Transport 
Information
Technology and 
Communication
Railway TransportBDZ Passenger Servicies Ltd
BDZ Freight Servicies Ltd
2 Sea Ports (Burgas and Varna) Maritime Transport
3 River Ports (Ruse, Vidin and Lom) Inland Waterway Transport
4 Airports (Sofia, Plovdiv, Ruse, G-Oryahovica) Air Transport
Bulgarian Posts Pls Postal Servicies
Bulgarian Stock Exchange JSC
Minister of Finance Financial servicies
Bulgarian Development Bank JSC
Napoitelny Sistemy (Irrigation Systems) Pls Ministry of Agriculture 
and food
Agriculture
Ribni Resursi (Fishing resources) Ltd
Terem Pls and it's subsidiary companies:
TEREM TSAR SAMUIL Ltd
TEREM-OVECH Ltd
TEREM–Krz Flotski Arsenal Varna Ltd
TEREM IVAILO Ltd
EREM HAN KRUM Ltd
TEREM-LETETS Ltd
Minister of Defence Military repair and production
29 Water supply companies
Minister of Regional 
Development and 
Public Works
Water supply
Agency of Diplomatic real estate Ltd
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
Property management
68 Hospitals Minister of Health Medical servicies
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Appendix 2: List of 30 SOEs in Korea as of 2015
NAME MINISTRY FUNCTION
Incheon International Airport Corporation
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport
Transportation
Korea Airports Corporation
Busan Port Authority
Incheon Port Authority
Ulsan Port Authority
Yeosu-Gwangyang Port Authority
Korea Expressway Corporation
Korea Railway Corporation
Korea Land and Housing Corporation
Land Development
Korea Water Resources Corporation
Jeju Free International City Development 
Center
Korea Appraisal Board
Korea Housing Finance Corporation
Korea Electricity Power Corporation
Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Energy
Resource and Energy
Korea Gas Corporation
Korea National Oil Corporation
Korea Resources Corporation
Korea Coal Corporation
Korea District Heating Corporation
Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Corporation
5 Power Generating Corporations
Korea Horse-Racing Agency
Ministry of Culture, Sports 
and Tourism
Others
Korea Broadcasting Advertisement 
Corporation
Korea Communications 
Commission
Korea Minting and Security Printing 
Corporation
Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance
Korea Marine Environnent Management 
Corporation
Ministry of Oceans 
and Fisheries
